All of these types of case start from the principles
re-affirmed by Black LJ above: that there should be finality in litigation: a
person should not generally be troubled by the same litigation twice (see eg The Ampthill Peerage case
 AC 547).
However, so far as possible cases should be decided on the true facts (ie not
eg where material evidence was not considered below). (These principles are
likely to be part of the argument where permission to appeal has been given by
the Supreme Court in two alleged non-disclosure cases: Sharland v Sharland
 EWCA Civ 95,  2 FLR 89 and Gohil v Gohil
 EWCA Civ 274,  1 FLR 178.)
The route for applications to set aside a consent order was
summarised by Sir James Munby P in CS v
(above) at para  as:
- ‘A fresh action to set aside the consent order’
(and see de Lasala v de Lasala 
AC 546, PC);
- an appeal, which he said needed ‘no
elaboration’: but see SCA 19981, s 17 below; and
- an application to the judge who made the order
(which is the course taken in CS and
approved by the President).
Application to ‘set
aside an order’: which court?
In B-T v B-T
 2 FLR 1 Ward J (as he then was), in a judgment described by a five judge
Court of Appeal (in Taylor v Lawrence
 EWCA Civ 90,  QB 528)
as ‘masterly’, explained the various courses open to an applicant in cases such
as this, and that the course chosen depended on the court in which application
was made. In 1990 family proceedings were in the High Court (as now) and the
county court under three different sets of rules. Since April 1984 there
remains a similar division in family courts as between High Court and the
Family Court, with one set of rules but differing statutory provisions (not
considered by either the president in CS
nor by the Court of Appeal in Re D
In the High Court only, SCA 1981, s 17 prevents ‘applications
for a new trial’ – ie to set aside a decision – save on appeal to the Court of
Appeal (s 17(1)) ‘except where rules of court … provide’ (s 17(2)):
for new trial
(1) Where any cause or matter, or any issue in any
cause or matter, has been tried in the High Court, any application for a new
trial thereof, or to set aside a verdict, finding or judgment therein, shall be
heard and determined by the Court of Appeal except where rules of court made in
pursuance of subsection (2) provide otherwise.
regards cases where the trial was by a judge alone and no error of the court at
the trial is alleged, or any prescribed class of such cases, rules of court may
provide that any such application as is mentioned in subsection (1) shall be
heard and determined by the High Court.
Thus an application to set aside in the High Court must be
to the Court of Appeal which can then allow an appeal by a variety of disposals
which include (at Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (‘CPR 1998’), r 52.10(2)) to ‘set
aside or vary any order or judgment’ or ‘order a new trial or hearing’ (all
words echoed in s 17(1)).
In the Family Court only Matrimonial and Family Proceedings
Act 1984, s 31F(6) (which has effect from April 2014) provides as follows:
family court has power to vary, suspend, rescind or revive any order made by
it, including –
power to rescind an order and re-list the application on which it was made,
power to replace an order which for any reason appears to be invalid by another
which the court has power to make, and
power to vary an order with effect from when it was originally made.
In that part of FPR 2010 which deals with the ‘general case
management powers’ of the family courts (ie High Court and Family Court) r
4.1(6) provides as follows: ‘A power of the court under [FPR 2010] to make an order
includes a power to vary or revoke the order.’ So, says the President (in CS v ACS
at para ) ‘…
the family court (by virtue of section 31F(6)(a) and FPR 4.1(6)) has a general
power to "rescind" or "revoke" an order’; but to what
extent? He holds (at para ) that r 4.1(7) enables application
to be made to the original trial judge to set aside the order.
Procedure on appeal
or fresh application
the Court of Appeal considered fully the impact of s 17(1) on procedure in set
aside cases (at paras -); though ultimately they rejected Mrs Gohil’s
appeal. The President mentions to the passage in Gohil
, but limits his citation only to para  which refers only
to the power of the court to set aside for non-disclosure confirmed by Livesey
(formerly Jenkins) v Jenkins
 AC 424,  FLR 813.
The President therefore makes no specific reference to s 17.
He does not therefore explain how he distinguishes the position he finds in CS v ACS
from that described by Ward J
in BT v BT
; nor does he explain why
SCA 1981, s 17(1) does not apply, or why – if he says it does – MFPA 1984, s
31F(6) overrides s 17(1), at least in the High Court.
As to Re D
family proceedings application to set aside or to appeal: if it is to be an
appeal (whether on Barder
out of time principles) application is by procedure under FPR 2010 Part 30 (or
if to the Court of Appeal by CPR 1998 Part 52); and if by separate application
by FPR 2010 Part 23 in the original proceedings, or by fresh application under
FPR 2010 Part 19. And if fresh evidence is to be adduced on an appeal separate
application should be made in the appeal notice to adduce that evidence under
principles in Ladd v Marshall
 1 WLR 1489, (1954) FLR Rep 422.
The views expressed by contributing authors are not necessarily those of Family Law or Jordan Publishing and should not be considered as legal advice.