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' Turning to the non-disclosure [of bugging of the parents by the police: largely inconclusive], I find that the nub of the matter is as follows. The existence of the recording was known to the three investigating officers in 2013, but they did not consider that it had any evidential value. It should have been obvious, in particular to the officer who appeared before me just four weeks after the recording was made, that it had to be disclosed, but it was not. Because of its special status, it was not held on the case file. The Constabulary's lawyers and the officers who were not involved in the investigation process were therefore not aware of its existence until a much later stage.
 The efficient process of disclosure between the criminal and family jurisdictions is essential to the proper administration of justice. It is governed by protocols and on occasions reinforced by court orders. The criminal and family courts must be able to rely on assurances that all relevant material has been disclosed, though in some cases they may have to resolve claims of public interest immunity.'
'… The matter was therefore restored before me and I directed a further fact-finding hearing to be listed urgently before me. The father duly filed a statement in which he described in detail the circumstances in which he had come to inflict the injuries. The mother filed a statement setting out her response to the father's confession. Two experts filed addendum reports in which they accepted that the injuries could have been sustained in the incidents described by the father.
 The resumed fact-finding hearing took place, at the conclusion of which I delivered an ex tempore judgment which has also been transcribed but, to date, not released for publication nor disclosed to the police. In that judgment (hereafter referred to as "my second judgment"), I concluded, on a balance of probabilities, that the injuries had been inflicted by the father in the manner described in his statement ...'
A comprehensive account of the law and practice governing public law child protection proceedings
'12.73 Communication of information: general
(1) For the purposes of the law relating to contempt of court, information relating to proceedings held in private (whether or not contained in a document filed with the court) may be communicated –
PD12G lists communications in children proceedings which can be passed on to particular bodies or individuals. Paragraph 2.1 sets out a table which deals with ‘any information relating to the proceedings’. It enables this information to be passed on by specified individuals – for example, a party, legal representative or others lawfully in possession of the information – for specified purposes, other than the proceedings. For example, a party or a legal representative can pass information to a person conducting ‘an approved research project’. Any communication in accordance with the provisions of PD12G is, by para 1.2, ‘Subject to any direction of the court ...’; that is subject to any other court order – such as that sought by the father in Re X and Y.(a) where the communication is to [various individuals and bodies such as the legal representative of a party, Legal Aid Agency, a court appointed expert etc, formally entitled to receive information];
(b) where the court gives permission; or
(c) subject to any direction of the court, in accordance with rule 12.75 and Practice Direction 12G.'
' Thus the scheme of the current rules is that communication of information relating to care proceedings falls into three categories:
(1) communications under r 12.73(1)(a), which may be made as a matter of right;Plainly, whereas the onus in respect of proposed communications under r 12.73(1)(b) lies on the party seeking permission to communicate, the onus in respect of communications that would otherwise be permitted under r 12.73(1)(c) and Practice Direction 12G paras 1 and 2 lies on the party contending that such communication should not be permitted.'
(2) communications under r 12.73(1)(c) and PD 12G paras 1 and 2, which may be made, but are subject to any direction by the court, including, in appropriate circumstances, a direction that they should not be made; and
(3) other communications, which under 12.73(1)(b) may only be made with the court's permission.
' As indicated in Re H by Thorpe LJ, Re EC remains the leading authority when deciding whether to disclose confidential information arising in care proceedings. The analysis conducted by Swinton Thomas LJ was comprehensive and the 10 factors identified by him all remain relevant to such a decision.'
'… The importance of such co-operation – recognised by the courts at the time of the Re EC decision – is now perceived as being crucial in maximising the protection given to children. This recognition underpins the recently published 2013 Protocol and Good Practice Model: Disclosure of information in cases of alleged child abuse and linked criminal and care directions hearings (the 2013 Protocol).
 Linked to this … is the fifth factor identified by Swinton Thomas LJ – the public interest in the administration of justice, and the argument that barriers should not be erected between one branch of the judicature and another because this may be inimical to the overall interests of justice. Again, the importance of this principle has been widely accepted, and it is again reflected in the terms of the 2013 Protocol.'
' As has been acknowledged by many judges on previous occasions – for example, Baron J in Re M (Care: Disclosure to Police)  2 FLR 390 at para  – it is the police who have a duty to investigate crime and it is the CPS which has a duty to decide whether to bring criminal charges. It is not for the family court to decide whether prosecutions should be brought or pursued. Disclosure of the judgment will enable the police and CPS to decide whether or not to pursue the criminal investigation. In carrying out the balancing exercise as to disclosure of the judgments, this court recognises the importance of not impeding those bodies from carrying out their statutory duties.'The 2013 Protocol and the references in FPR 2010 provide the framework for co-operation in communication between local authorities, the police and the family courts. It remains to be seen to what extent it can specifically be relied upon in individual cases to assist with such communication for the help of abused children.